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Background: There is general agreement, including from the pharmaceutical industry, that current market based
methods of generating research into the development of pharmaceutical products that are relevant for developing
countries do not work. This conclusion is relevant not just for the most neglected diseases such as leishmaniasis
but even for global diseases such as cancer and cardiovascular disease.
Discussion: Stimulating research will mean overcoming barriers such as patent thickets, poor coordination of
research activities, exclusive licensing of new technologies by universities and the structural problems that inhibit
conducting appropriate clinical trials in developing countries. In addition, it is necessary to ensure that the priorities
for research reflect the needs of developing countries and not just donors. This article will explore each of these
issues and then look at three emerging approaches to stimulating research -paying for innovation, priority review
sales or vouchers and public-private partnerships, - and evaluate their strengths and weaknesses.
Summary: All of the stakeholders agree that there is a pressing need for a major expansion in the level of R&D.
Whatever that new model turns out to be, it will have to deal with the 5 barriers outlined in this paper. Finally,
none of the three proposals considered here for expanding research is free from major limitations.
Background
Research and development (R&D) of new medicines is
driven by the market where the market typically means
large numbers of potential patients with chronic diseases
who live in first world countries. These people either
have the ability to purchase medicines on their own or,
as is more often the case, the cost of medicines is cov-
ered publicly. Under these circumstances, companies are
able to realize sustained substantial rates of return [1]
and are willing to invest in the necessary R&D.
There is general agreement that this model for R&D
has failed when it comes to neglected diseases. This
assessment comes not just from critics of pharmaceuti-
cal companies but from within the industry itself. Speak-
ing to a reporter from the Financial Times, Daniel
Vasella, the CEO of Novartis, said “We have no model
which would (meet) the need for new drugs in a sus-
tainable way ... You can’t expect for-profit organization
[s] to do this on a large scale. If you want to establish a
system where companies systematically invest in this
kind of area, you need a different system.” [2]
Evidence of market failure is not hard to document.
Between 1975 and 2004 only 21 out of 1556 marketed
new chemical entities were indicated for neglected dis-
eases [3]. In spring 2001, the 20 top-grossing pharma-
ceutical companies in the world were surveyed about
recent drug development activity for 5 neglected dis-
eases - Chagas disease, leishmaniasis, malaria, sleeping
sickness and tuberculosis. Eleven companies responded;
8 had spent nothing on Chagas disease, leishmaniasis
and sleeping sickness and 7 spent less than 1% of their
total R&D budget on any of the 5 diseases [4]. In the
ensuing years little changed with respect to industry
initiated R&D for neglected diseases; 5 out of 12 of the
top multinational companies were not conducting any
research and these companies were unwilling to enter
this area regardless of any incentives offered to them
[5]. Furthermore, many of the (few) drugs that industry
had developed were of low overall value to developing
countries because they were poorly suited to situations
in these countries; for example, they needed to be
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able, had poor efficacy or a poor safety profile [5].
The reason behind these failures had little if anything
to do with any scientific issues. The World Health
Organization considered the scientific feasibility of
developing new drugs for 7 major neglected diseases to
be high [6]. “Key factors explaining the poor health per-
formance of industry-developed drugs are: industry
R&D choices based on primary Western priorities
(safety and efficacy); insufficient focus on additional
developing country issues such as suitability and likely
end price; pressure on companies to balance the cost-
benefit equation by maximising the Western market for
their products (eg focusing on Western strains and
needs); lack of company knowledge; lack of public input;
and the need for companies to limit risk and liability, for
instance, by excluding paediatric patients and pregnant
women.” [5]
Although most of the focus has been on drugs for
very neglected diseases such as leishmaniasis and Chagas
disease it needs to be recognized that the problem in
researching drugs for diseases in developing countries is
much wider. Conditions such as Chagas disease are
usually referred to as Type III diseases, ones that are
overwhelmingly or exclusively incident in developing
countries, and since there is no developed country
demand there is no R&D taking place. (See Table 1.)
Type I diseases are incident in both rich and poor coun-
tries, with large numbers of vulnerable populations in
each and include both communicable diseases e.g.,
measles and noncommunicable diseases, e.g., diabetes,
and tobacco-related illnesses. Type II diseases are inci-
dent in both rich and poor countries, but with a sub-
stantial proportion of the cases in the poor countries, e.
g., HIV/AIDS and tuberculosis. Although Types I and II
attract pharmaceutical company R&D activity, drugs
developed for them may not be appropriate for develop-
ing countries. In Type I diseases there is a lack of incen-
tive to invest in the search for preventive, diagnostic and
curative interventions adapted to the resources and
social and economic conditions of developing countries
while in Type II diseases the type or strain of the dis-
ease in developing countries frequently differs from that
in developed countries, e.g., strains of HIV differ
between developed and developing countries [7].
While Type III diseases are still very serious they are
assuming a less important role in overall population
health [8] and aside from HIV/AIDS mortality from
communicable diseases is projected to continue decline
[9]. Outside of one region in Africa the majority of the
disease burden in people over 14 years of age is due to
a combination of non-communicable diseases and injury
making research into treatments for Type I and II dis-
eases in developing countries imperative.
The next section of this article will explore some of
the main systematic barriers to expanding research
capacity and look at solutions, using existing examples
where possible, to overcoming these barriers. Next, I
will analyze three specific proposals that are being
advanced for increasing R&D into diseases that are of
primary concern to developing countries and look at the
strengths and weaknesses of each of these proposals.
Discussion
Barriers to expanding research capacity
Barriers to expanding research capacity exist at many
levels. There will never be enough money to tackle all
of the health problems of the developing world simulta-
neously and therefore, it is necessary to decide which
diseases deserve the most attention. That decision is
l i k e l yt ob em a d eb ym u l t i p l ed i f f e r e n ta c t o r s ,w h i c h
means that there will need to be a measure of research
coordination amongst all of the players. In considering
pharmaceutical research the issue of intellectual prop-
erty rights or patents is always front and centre. Univer-
sities are often the site of much of the fundamental
research behind new medicines but increasingly univer-
sities are restricting access to patents that they have
taken out on the fruits of their research in the hopes of
a large financial windfall from an exclusive license.
Medical research does not arise de novo but builds on
work that has previously been done. Especially in the
case of biotechnology, there may be many steps behind
any new research and each of those steps may be
patented and those patents held by different entities.
Unless there is cooperation in sharing those patents
Table 1 Types of diseases
Type Definition Example Barriers to therapy in developing countries
Type
1
Diseases that are incident in both developed and developing
countries with large numbers of vulnerable populations in both
groups of countries
Diabetes No market incentive to invest in interventions adapted to




Diseases that are incident in both developed and developing
countries but with a substantial proportion of the cases in
developing countries








No market incentive to invest in research
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is a new medicine ready for testing it is essential that
clinical trials be conducted on the most relevant popula-
tions and in the case of neglected diseases these are
populations in developing countries. In order to be able
to do trials in these settings the countries in question
have to have the capacity to support clinical trials.
i. Priority setting
There may be general agreement that new methods
need to be found to advance research into diseases
affecting developing countries but to date that agree-
ment has not translated into funding that is propor-
tional to the burden of disease in these areas. World
Health Organization (WHO) funding in both the Wes-
tern Pacific and African regions is heavily skewed
towards infectious diseases while funding for non-com-
municable diseases and injury and violence is signifi-
cantly below the contribution that they make to global
mortality and disability-adjusted life years (DALY). This
mismatch in funding is even more pronounced in the
WHO’s extra-budgetary revenue than in its regular bud-
get [10]. Extra-budgetary revenue comes from voluntary
contributions mostly from governments, foundations
and the United Nations system and are allocated
according to donors’ preferences, mainly for specific dis-
ease-control programs.
Even within the world of communicable diseases
donor funding does not correlate with the burden of
disease. Shiffman [11] calculated donor funding for 20
historically high-burden communicable diseases for the
years 1996 to 2003 from 42 major donors, classifying
grants according to the communicable disease targeted.
Annual donor dollars per DALY ranged from almost
$2500 for polio to $0.58 for acute respiratory infections.
According to Shiffman the pattern of donation does not
fully reflect either the needs of the recipients in terms of
humanitarian concerns and the most pressing problems
of people in developing nations nor is it fully explained
by a provider perspective, that is, the interests of consti-
tuencies in industrialized states. A third factor may be
that donors are imitating one another especially, follow-
ing the lead of large funders such as the Gates Founda-
tion [12].
Imitating the actions of large donors may be especially
problematic when one funder dominates the scene as is
the case with respect to the Gates Foundation and
malaria research. In the late 1990s as little as $84 mil-
lion annually was being spent but since 2000 the Gates
Foundation has put $1.2 billion into the effort. The
chief of the malaria program at the WHO alleged that
the consequence of the growing dominance of the Gates
Foundation was a stifling in the diversity of views
among scientists[12]. Others have criticized the Gates
Foundation for having a “narrowly conceived
understanding of health as the product of technical
interventions divorced from economic, social, and politi-
cal contexts” pointing to the Grand Challenges issued
by the Foundation as example of this orientation [13].
The data cited here do not necessarily directly trans-
late into spending on new drug research for diseases in
developing countries but it is reasonable to assume that
if overall health care funding is heavily skewed then
research money will follow the same pattern. This
assumption is reinforced by looking at the composition
of the leadership of the large health-related public-
private partnerships (PPPs) that have recently been cre-
ated. Most PPPs are based in the United States with the
remainder located in Europe. “As a result, almost all
monies raised by [PPPs] are channeled through first-
w o r l dh e a do f f i c e s ,a n da n yd e c i s i o n sm a d er e g a r d i n g
how these are spent in developing countries are made
by the CEOs, together with their senior staff and boards
(statutory and advisory)” the overwhelming majority of
whom are Caucasian, and are residents of either the
United States or Europe. “Not one ‘global’ [PPP] is led
by a person who is a developing-country national, and
not one resides within one of the developing countries
severely affected by neglected infectious diseases ... In
addition, the main advisory boards of [PPPs] mostly
have no people representing ‘on-the-ground’ commu-
nities in Africa, despite the fact that this input is critical
i fl a r g es t u d i e sa r et oh a v ec u l t u r a ls e n s i t i v i t yi n
resource-poor environments.” [14] Recommendations
have been made to at least four PPPs - International
AIDS Vaccine Initiative, Multilateral Initiative on
Malaria, Global Alliance for the Elimination of Lympha-
tic Filariasis and Medicines for Malaria Venture - to
increase the diversity of representation on their boards
so that they reflect the communities in which they are
active [15].
It may sound trite, but priorities cannot just be set by
donors (public or private) and the governments of
developed and developing countries. All parties will
need to do more to ensure that health care workers on
the ground in developing countries and the people who
will be the direct recipients of any new research initia-
tives are intimately involved in setting priorities for the
research agenda. At a minimum this will require build-
ing up research capacity in the developing world, creat-
ing career structures for clinicians and scientists so that
they are able to fully participate at the global level and
developing initiatives to engage the communities that
are affected by the diseases in question.
ii. Coordination of research efforts
Closely related to the question of priority setting is the
coordination of research efforts undertaken by the var-
ious actors. This issue has recently been examined by
Oxfam International in a briefing paper it produced on
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developing countries[16]. The report notes that within
donor countries there is little coordination of activities
and therefore governments do not necessarily know
where they are allocating their research dollars. The
result is that it is very unlikely that meaningful research
targets can be established and even if they are that gov-
ernments can be held accountable to these targets.
What exists internally within countries is mirrored
internationally with little coordination in the activities of
different countries or between countries and other
donors. This lack of coordination can lead to three
types of problems: redundancy in the work that multiple
countries or donors are undertaking, policy lacunae in
the sense that there are essential tasks that are not
being done and an incoherence in aims due to each
actor having a different set of priorities and policies [17].
A social constructionist explanation for why some glo-
bal health issues rise to prominence has to due with the
effectiveness with which global health policy commu-
nities portray and communicate their “severity, neglect,
tractability and benefit in ways that appeal to political
leaders’ social values and concepts of reality.” In order
to achieve issue ascendance and sustainability and there-
fore the necessary political attention, these portrayals
also need to “be accompanied by institutions that create,
negotiate, promote and sustain” them [18]. Poor coordi-
nation is one factor behind the failure to develop a
strong policy community able to realize these objectives
and the upshot is that certain health issues are over-
looked in the allocation of R&D dollars despite the dis-
ease burden that they represent. The problem with
coordination and health conditions that remain outside
the spotlight may explain the priorities of the European
Commission during its Sixth Research Framework Pro-
gramme where 420 million Euros was spent on R&D for
HIV and AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria while all other
neglected diseases combined received only about one-
tenth of that amount [16].
To overcome the lack of coordination Oxfam is pro-
posing the creation of a formalized framework to coor-
dinate donor funding initiatives. Working within such
a framework donors could examine the synergistic
effects of different incentive mechanisms and at the
same time help to ensure that money is allocated pro-
portionately amongst the different competing priorities.
A single agency could also keep records about which
chemical compounds have already been rejected during
screening, so that other researchers would not need-
lessly duplicate efforts. Finally, a formalized framework
would provide “an avenue for recipient countries to
participate and provide input about actual funding
needs, priorities, and approaches that are appropriate
in their countries.” [16]
iii. Intellectual property rights and publicly funded research
Many of the drugs that eventually make it to the market
are the product of basic research that has been publicly
funded. According to a report commissioned for the
United States (US) Senate, 15 of the 21 most important
drugs introduced between 1965 and 1992 were devel-
oped using knowledge and techniques from federally
funded research [19]. Much of this research is carried
out in university settings. The passage of the Bayh-Dole
Act in the US in 1980, and similar policies in other
countries, gave universities the rights to any patents
resulting from grants or contracts funded by any federal
agency. Universities own patents on nearly 1 in 5
(19.2%) of the new molecular entities that received
‘’priority’’ approval from the US Food and Drug Admin-
istration (FDA), including key patents on over one quar-
ter of the HIV/AIDS drugs approved since 1988[20].
Once the legal and salary costs are considered (and all
other costs are ignored) then a university technology
transfer office with the median income, number of
employees, and legal fees expended would generate an
annual net income of only about US$30,000[21]. How-
ever, despite this marginal amount of money, many uni-
versities have restricted access to the products and
knowledge of publicly funded research in the hopes of
gaining revenue windfalls from exclusive licensing of
patents to large commercial entities such as pharmaceu-
tical companies. They hope to emulate Emory University
which sold its rights to royalties for the antiretrovirals
emtricitabine and tenofovir to Gilead Sciences and Roy-
alty Pharma for a lump sum payment of US $525 mil-
lion [22].
The issue of university-owned patents came to a head
in 2001 when Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) sought
the permission of Yale University to use a generic ver-
sion of stavudine, an antiretroviral drug, to treat South
African patients. The university had granted an exclu-
sive license for this product to Bristol-Myers Squibb. As
ar e s u l to fM S F ’s request and global attention, negotia-
tions between Yale and Bristol-Myers Squibb lead the
company to allow generic stavudine to be bought and
sold within South Africa and to a 97% reduction in the
price of the patented drug in South Africa[22].
Universities Allied for Essential Medicines (UAEM), a
coalition of students and faculty at about 25 universities
across North America, focuses on the role of universities
as a starting point for closing the access and research
gaps. UAEM has “put forward two specific policy propo-
sals: (1) universities should adopt licensing provisions
that facilitate access to their health-related innovations
in poor countries, and (2) universities should promote
research on neglected tropical diseases and find ways to
work with nontraditional partners (such as developing-
world research institutions and public-private
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diseases.”[22]
iv. Intellectual property rights and patent thickets
Besides encouraging universities to acquire patents on
their inventions the Bayh-Dole Act,a l o n gw i t ht h e
increasing commercialization of biomedical research,
has lead to a proliferation of patents, especially in the
field of biotechnology. The rapid increase in patents has
the potential consequence of inhibiting research into
diseases and treatments, a phenomenon that has
acquired the name “the tragedy of the anticom-
mons.”[23] In this situation a resource, here biomedical
knowledge, processes or products, may be underused
because multiple owners each have a right to exclude
others from a scarce resource and no one has an effec-
tive privilege of use. “Each upstream patent allows its
owner to set up another tollbooth on the road to pro-
duct development, adding to the cost and slowing the
pace of downstream biomedical innovation.”[23]
The emerging patent thicket represents a distinct
threat to the traditions of open science required for pro-
gress. It has the potential to choke off collaboration
while adding transaction costs to the price of doing
research. It’s impossible to quantify the damage done by
this early stage scientific patenting because how can one
count the number of researchers who abandon a line of
research because they can’t get access to the necessary
licenses or execute the necessary material transfer agree-
ments? How does one count the number of researchers
who never even consider a line of research because
someone else has already locked up the key patents?[24]
One way out of this dilemma is the creation of patent
pools. The idea behind a patent pool is that multiple
owners of patents dealing with the same subject matter
a r eb r o u g h tt o g e t h e rb yas i n g l eo r g a n i z a t i o n .T h e s e
patents are then made available to interested parties –
researchers, manufacturers, etc. - on a non-exclusive
basis subject to the payment of royalties. The advantage
of patent pools is that it avoids negotiations with each
individual patent holder[25].
In February 2009 GlaxoSmithKline (GSK) announced
that it would put any chemicals and processes over
which it controlled patent rights and that might contri-
bute to research on neglected diseases into a patent
pool in order to stimulate research[26]. GSK did not
define what it meant by neglected diseases and since it
does not consider HIV a neglected disease it has not
included patents on these drugs in the pool it has cre-
ated[27]. All the same, the move was welcomed by orga-
nizations such as Oxfam and MSF.
Patent pools are also being championed by UNITAID.
The organization was set up to contribute to scaling up
access to treatment for HIV/AIDS, malaria and tubercu-
losis, primarily for people in low-income countries, by
leveraging price reductions for quality diagnostics and
medicines and by accelerating the pace at which these
are made available[28]. The UNITAID patent pool, once
established, will be voluntary and it will function with-
out any fundamental changes to the existing system of
intellectual property rights for medicines. Brand-name
companies may find the pool an attractive option as it
will give them a very visible way of showing their com-
mitment to access to medicines which could produce
significant public relations benefits[29].
v. Clinical trial capacity
Clinical trials are essential in order to establish the effi-
cacy and relative safety of new medicines. Especially in
the case of Type III diseases, but also for Type I and II
diseases, it is imperative that trials of new medicines be
carried out in the developing countries where these dis-
eases are most prevalent. However, despite the increase
in the number of trials being undertaken in some devel-
oping countries [30] there are 3 structural barriers to
expanding trial capacity, especially in sub-Saharan
Africa, that need to be overcome: inadequate trial site
capacity, limited regulatory ability to approve and super-
vise trials and the poor quality of ethical review commit-
tees[7].
According to the WHO Commission on Intellectual
Property Rights (2006), as of about 2005 there were
over 300 products for neglected diseases in development
globally but the trial capacity in developing countries
was unable to support this volume of potential products.
WHO estimates that only 1 in 6 of its membership, pri-
marily developed countries, have a well functioning reg-
ulatory system. Of the rest, one-third have either no
system or one that barely functions and the remainder
have systems at varying levels of development and
operational capacity[31]. Ethics boards in US are much
more likely to raise issues such as the need for local lan-
guage consent forms, and confidentiality protection of
participants than are boards in developing countries[32].
“Strengthening the R&D capacity in developing coun-
tries by investing in African owned health research cen-
tres capable of conducting clinical trials has thus been
identified as an international priority to improve public
health and, indirectly, development. Efforts should be
focused on the establishment and strengthening of
locally controlled and managed research centres able to
pursue their own priorities and R&D agenda. The exis-
tence of internationally recognized institutes will also
strengthen the position of African R&D priorities in
international initiatives, and increases the ability to
influence cash flows.”[33] Addressing these issues and
strengthening indigenous capacity will make it more
likely that African (and other developing country)
researchers will be able to set their own priorities and
design their own protocols rather than relying on
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which may not fully understand the issues faced in
developing countries.
Developing countries with some technological capacity
have been relatively successful in building up an indi-
genous research capacity. Both Brazil and Cuba are pro-
ducers of vaccines. Brazil is the world’s largest producer
and exporter of yellow fever vaccine and the meningitis
B vaccine from Cuba was the first in the world against
this strain of the bacteria[7]. In countries with a lesser
degree of technological sophistication partnerships with
Western organizations and countries are being devel-
oped and there have been some positive changes in
funding directed at improving clinical trial capacity. The
European and Developing Countries Clinical Trials Part-
nership focuses on the latter phases of clinical trials in
sub-Saharan Africa for medicines, vaccines, and micro-
biocides against HIV/AIDS, malaria, and TB. The
Fogarty Centre in the US provides research grants for
collaborative research and capacity-building projects
relevant to low- and middle-income nations[16].
Proposals to expand research capacity
Governments, non-governmental organizations, intergo-
vernmental organizations such as WHO, pharmaceutical
companies and academics are all engaged in putting for-
ward, and in some cases implementing, proposals for
ways to overcome the problems with market failure that
has so far characterized research into diseases of devel-
oping countries. This section looks at three proposals
that have gained the most attention in recent years and
examines their strengths and weaknesses. The first one
is still at the stage of a proposal but the next two are
being put into action.
i. Paying for innovation
Various authors have advanced schemes to promote
research into neglected diseases that are based on pay-
ing the innovator from a prize fund[1,34-38]. One exam-
ple of this type of scheme is the Health Impact Fund
(HIF)[35]. Under this proposal companies could con-
tinue to market their products in the usual way under a
patent or they could opt to register a new product (or a
new use for an old product) with HIF. If the company
chose this latter option then it would commit to sell the
medicine wherever it is needed at the lowest feasible
price based on production and distribution costs. Once
the reward period ended the manufacturer would be
required to offer free licenses to enable generic produc-
tion. In return, it would be rewarded annually from the
HIF’s fixed pool of money on the basis of the product’s
global health impact in its first ten years following mar-
keting approval, or on the assessed health impact of the
new use of the product for a period of five years. In
assessing the health impact, the HIF would “estimate
the difference between (1) the actual health status of
people who consumed the registered product and (2)
the estimated health status of these people, had they not
had access to the registered product or to any other
products introduced less than two years before the
registered product.”[39] Financing for HIF would come
from partner countries that commit to providing fund-
ing, currently pegged at about 0.03% of gross national
income, for at least 12 years so that innovators would
have some assurance about the payments they could
expect to receive. HIF is estimated to cost about $6 bil-
lion annually.
Other proposals differ in major ways from HIF [34]
but they all base their payments on the therapeutic
value of the new products. This type of payment system
potentially has significant advantages for companies
since the greater the health benefits from their product
(s) the more money they receive. Therefore, they are
incentivized, at least in theory, to do research on dis-
eases with major medical needs.
Making payments contingent on assessing therapeutic
value presents its own set of problems the most promi-
n e n to fw h i c hi sw h e r ew i l lt h ee v i d e n c ec o m ef r o mt o
assess therapeutic value? Virtually all of the premarket-
ing data on safety and efficacy comes from the pharma-
ceutical company that produces the medication and
multiple studies have confirmed that this data is highly
biased in favour of the company[40]. Furthermore, most
of the clinical trials funded by pharmaceutical compa-
nies are short-term, often use surrogate endpoints and
are placebo controlled[41]. If trials use an active com-
parator they are almost always non-inferiority trials
meaning that the best that can be said is that two pro-
ducts are equivalent. Most pharmacoeconomic evalua-
tions produced by manufacturers have significant
methodological errors[42,43]. Relying on companies for
postmarketing studies is also problematic. A review of
31 such projects in the United Kingdom concluded that
company sponsored postmarketing surveillance studies
had made only a limited contribution to the assessment
of drug safety, principally because of weak study designs
and difficulties in recruitment[44].
Aside from pharmaceutical companies there are lim-
ited resources available for generating information about
therapeutic value. Public funding for clinical research is
minimal even in developed countries and will be even
scarcer in developing countries. Pogge and colleagues
[39] recognize the problems with funding and propose
that 10% of the HIF annual budget or $600 million be
put aside to measure health impact. However, even with
this money there are significant obstacles to gathering
reliable data in developing countries including making
accurate diagnoses, ensuring that the medicines are
being used correctly, having the necessary technology to
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patients living in remote areas. Moreover, even if it is
possible to assemble the necessary data it might take
years to do so. Will companies be willing to wait that
long before starting to receive payments from the prize
fund? It is possible that payments could begin before all
the necessary data is collected but this runs the risk of
under or overestimating the therapeutic value of new
products. Both possibilities would create financial pro-
blems for HIF. If therapeutic value was underestimated
then additional money for these companies would need
to be found from future HIF budgets decreasing the
amount available for other products. If therapeutic value
was overestimated, then although HIF could recover its
excessive payments at a point in the future, it would
still have restricted its payments in the present and have
consequently paid less than what was appropriate for
more valuable medications.
This list of difficulties is not to say that therapeutic
value cannot be measured but before paying for innova-
tion can be a reality there will have to be major strides
in overcoming these problems. Clinical trial registries
and registries for clinical trial results are one avenue for
making information more public. There are also calls
for safety and efficacy data filed with regulatory authori-
ties for approval purposes to be made public [45]. How-
ever, both of these proposals still leave the generation of
clinical information in the control of the pharmaceutical
companies. One promising suggestion for overcoming
this barrier is to separate the funding from the actual
conduct of the clinical trials by requiring the companies
to turn over the money for clinical trials to a neutral
organization such as the National Institutes of Health.
This organization would then choose the investigator(s)
based on a peer reviewed process and would be respon-
sible for controlling the data from the trials.
ii. Priority review vouchers
Beginning in September 2008, the US implemented a
new system designed to increase research into neglected
diseases. As described by Kesselheim [46] under this
system the FDA will give a company marketing a treat-
ment for a neglected disease in the US a “voucher” enti-
tling it to a priority review for any other product it sells.
The difference in time between a standard approval (12
m o n t h s )a n dap r i o r i t yr e v i e w( 6m o n t h s )c o u l db e
worth as much as $300 million to a company depending
on the sales potential of the product receiving the prior-
ity review. However, much of the research into
neglected diseases is undertaken by small companies
that are unlikely to have a large enough portfolio of pro-
ducts to benefit from a voucher. The legislation does
allow vouchers to be sold but this type of deal making
will lack transparency and may include intellectual prop-
erty rights that will increase the cost and/or restrict the
availability of products. According to Kesselheim [46]
“the program reflects a growing trend in health policy
toward reliance on substantial financial incentives to
achieve a socially desirable outcome.”
T h i si st h eo n l yo n eo ft h e3p r o p o s a l st h a ti sn o t
potentially subject to all 5 of the restrictions identified
in the previous section. Because the vouchers are issued
to a single company questions about priority setting and
coordination of efforts do not apply. However, because
research priorities are being left in the hands of a pri-
vate for-profit entity there are serious doubts about
whether such a system will have any effect in stimulat-
ing the necessary research.
The first of these vouchers was awarded in 2009 to
Novartis upon FDA approval of its combination product
(artemether/lumefantrine, trade name Coartem) for the
treatment of malaria. “Yet artemether/lumefantrine was
added to the WHO Essential Medicines List in 2002
and has been available in the developing world for years.
There is therefore no benefit whatsoever to patients in
the developing world from a US registration - and thus
no reason to reward the company. Other companies
could now come forward with even older drugs for tro-
pical diseases that they never bothered to register in the
US.”[47] Furthermore, it is highly unlikely that the pro-
spect of earning a voucher some years in the future will
be enough of a stimulus to large pharmaceutical compa-
nies to initiate a program of research into neglected dis-
eases. The value of a voucher will depend on the
company having one or more “blockbuster” drugs ready
for approval some years hence that could benefit from
the voucher. Given the current track record of compa-
nies in developing blockbuster drugs having one that is
approvable is hardly guaranteed. Small companies
already engaged in research on neglected diseases that
might be attracted by the possibility of a voucher may
not be in a position to use it because they only have the
resources to work on a few drugs at a time[46].
Finally, issuing priority reviews for drugs that are of a
company’s choosing distorts the intention of a priority
r e v i e w .T h i sm e c h a n i s mw a si n t e n d e dt oe n s u r et h a t
therapeutically valuable drugs would reach the market in
an expedited manner. What the voucher system does is
substitute therapeutic value for economic value. The two
are often not synonymous. One proposal for reforming
the voucher system is to auction off a fixed number of
vouchers per year, and use the proceeds for a prize fund
for neglected diseases[48]. However, this would just lead
to the question of how to judge therapeutic value. On-
the-whole, the wisest course would seem to be to aban-
don the voucher system in favour of some other method.
iii. Public-private partnerships
The definition of public-private partnerships (PPPs) is
somewhat fluid. Kaplan defines them as “collaborative
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zations ... [that] are institutionalized with public inter-
vention and/or funding”[49]. Moran et al [5] view “PPPs
as public health driven not-for-profit organisations that
drive neglected disease drug development in conjunction
with industry groups.” This definition includes groups
that do not define themselves as PPPs. For instance, the
Drugs for Neglected Diseases initiative (DNDi) sees itself
as a primarily public group and the Institute for One
World Health (iOWH) defines itself as a not-for-profit
private company[5].
PPPs do not conduct drug development themselves.
Their main functions are to integrate and co-ordinate
multiple industry and academic partners and contractors
along the drug development pipeline; allocate philan-
thropic and public funds to the ‘right’ kinds of R&D
projects; and manage neglected disease R&D portfolios
[5]. PPPs are the most advanced of the various alterna-
tives to the usual method of researching and developing
new drugs. A survey published in 2005 found that 47 of
63 new drugs for neglected diseases were being devel-
oped under the auspices of a PPP. One-third of these 47
drugs came out of PPPs involving large pharmaceutical
companies and the balance were from PPPs working
with a diversity of small firms, developing country firms,
academics and the public sector[5].
The multinational companies that get involved in
PPPs tend to focus their efforts on in-kind donations,
for example, access to their molecular library or on
early stage R&D leaving the costly development process
to others. Some of these large companies also have an
economic motivation for their involvement, as they see
some possible commercial value in the form of spin-off
research and obtaining exclusive rights to use the
research in developed countries. On-the-other hand,
small companies, biotechnology companies, contract
research organizations and firms in developing countries
have commercial imperatives different from those of
large pharmaceutical companies. The economic position
of these entities means that the smaller rewards that can
come from involvement in a PPP may make commercial
sense to them[7].
Although PPPs have enjoyed relative success there are
three key problems that still need to be overcome in
order to help ensure that they remain a viable option
for enhancing research activity. The first one, the lack of
representation from developing countries on the boards
of PPPs, has already been discussed in the section on
priority setting. Second is the question of intellectual
property rights. Although some companies have opted
to forgo patents on products that they are involved
with, others still plan to apply for patents that may
result in restricted access to knowledge and products.
Whereas the Sanofi-Aventis-DNDi group decided not to
file for a patent for its anti-malarial medicine, Novartis
wants to obtain a patent for any products it develops
through a PPP[50].
The third and most serious problem is the narrow
funding base for PPPs. Direct R&D spending by PPPs
between 2000 and 2006 is estimated to be just over $80
million with a similar amount from in-kind donations.
Very little of that money has come from public sources
with developed country governments contributing about
16% and the private sector has lagged even further
behind with just 2% of research funding coming from
that source. The bulk of the funding has originated
from philanthropic organizations with almost 60% from
the Gates Foundation alone[5]. Such heavy reliance on a
single source means that the priorities of PPPs may be
subject to the decisions of the board of the Gates
Foundation.
Without an adequate guarantee of funding PPPs may
have to make difficult decisions regarding the likelihood
of success and possibly terminate projects prematurely.
“A further constraint is the discrepancy between the
long-term nature of the R&D process and the relatively
short-term nature of funding pledges. Lack of certainty
of continuing funding inhibits long-term planning by
public-private partnerships. There may be a temptation
to seek to do things more cheaply but not necessarily
cost-effectively; promising research projects may be
delayed and relationships with partners may be damaged
because of a short-term approach.”[7]
While this article does not allow an in-depth analysis
of all of the suggestions for increasing PPP funding two
mechanisms, one for increased public funding and one
for private individual funding, will be described.
As a way to supplement the funding for PPPs, Moran
[5] has proposed the creation of a publicly funded
Industry R&D Facilitation Fund (IRFF) that would be a
long-term grant fund of between US $130 million and
US $190 million per year to underwrite industry partici-
pation in PPPs. IRFF funds would flow directly through
to industry partners in the PPPs in order to pay them
for neglected disease R&D, rather than financing PPPs
as organizations and leaving it for the PPPs to distribute
the money. The alleged benefits of this model are that
“public funders can allocate resources across all PPP
projects in the exact amounts needed exactly when they
are needed, allowing all R&D projects to move forward
simultaneously without delay” (emphasis in original), [5]
although how such precision would be achieved is not
described. Moran et al believe that the IRFF would
remove the need for donors to choose among PPPs
since all projects could be encompassed. This view
seems somewhat naïve as it ignores the political deci-
sions involved in choosing PPPs that fit with the priori-
ties of different governments. The governing structure
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how the IRFF would ensure that politics does not
become involved in decision making. Finally, given their
history so far in funding PPPs, it is not clear why gov-
ernments would now choose to commit to larger sums
on an ongoing basis.
Ziemba, [51] in a paper produced for the WHO’s
Commission on Intellectual Property Rights, Innovation
and Public Health, suggests that PPPs look at a funding
mechanism, called “PharmaShares”. Under this system
when pharmaceutical stocks are sold or purchased the
person doing the transaction is given the option to add
a tax deductible amount for contribution to an indepen-
dent “PharmaShares” fund. The fund then allocates
m o n e yt oP P P st h a th a v ea p p l i e dt oi t .W h i l et h i s
method may be useful in raising some money it hardly
seems like a sustainable long-term option.
In summary, PPPs seem to be the most promising
route for increasing R&D into neglected diseases but
they continue to face significant barriers in accessing
funding and that may ultimately limit how much they
are able to contribute.
Summary
There is actually a fair degree of unanimity amongst all
of the actors involved in research for neglected diseases
- they all agree that there is a pressing need for a major
expansion in the level of R&D, that the present market
based system cannot fulfill the task and that a new
model is needed. Whatever that new model turns out to
be, it will have to deal with the 5 barriers outlined in
this paper. While each of them can be overcome the
process of doing so will take time, commitment and
cooperation among the public and private sectors, non-
governmental organizations and the developing coun-
tries themselves. Finally, none of the three proposals
considered here for expanding research is free from
major limitations. The prize fund model has to deal
with how to assess therapeutic value in a timely, inde-
pendent and valid way, the voucher system is more a
model of corporate welfare than it is a system for deal-
ing with the needs of developing countries and PPPs
face the challenge of finding a long-term stable source
of financing. We are slowly moving ahead in expanding
research capacity but unless the limitations of the prize
fund model and PPPs are effectively dealt with we are
also in danger of, if not taking a step backwards, then
taking a step sideways rather than forward.
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